Abstract: Ih avet wo main goals in this paper.The first is to arguef or the thesis that Kant gave up on his highest good argument for the existenceofGod around 1800.T he second is to revive ad ialogue about this thesis that died out in the 1960s. The paper is divided into three sections. In the first,Ir econstruct Kant'sh ighest good argument.I nt he second, Iturn to the post-1800 convolutes of Kant's Opus postumum to discuss his repeatedclaim that there is onlyone way to arguefor the existenceofGod, away which resembles the highest good argument onlyintaking the morallaw as its starting point.Inthe third, Iexplain why Idonot find the counterarguments to my thesis introduced in the 1960spersua-sive.
Introduction
Ihavetwo main goals in this paper.The first is to arguethat Kant gave up on his highestg ood argument for the existenceo fG od around 1800.The second is to revive ad ialogue about this thesis thatd ied out in the 1960s: Ib elievet hat this dialogue, which seems to have concluded with the naysayers in ascendence, ended prematurely.
The paper is divided into three sections. In the first,Ireconstruct Kant's highestg ood argument in order to introduce the first piece of evidence in favoro fm yt hesis: Kant'sd eep-seated ambivalence about the various premises in this argument.Inthe second, Iturn to Kant's Opus postumum in order to canvass the second piece of evidence in favoro fm yt hesis: Kant'sm anyc laims to the effect that therei so nlyo ne wayt oa rgue for the existenceo fG od, aw ay which resembles the highest good argument onlyi nt aking the moral lawa s its starting point.I nt he third, Ie xamine the counterarguments to my thesis as they wereintroduced in the 1960s, and Iexplain whyIdo not find them persuasive:a lthough they undercut some of the evidence mustered by Adickes (the original proponent of my thesis), they leave the evidence on which Ib uild my argument unimpugned. In so doing,Iintroduce the third and final piece of evidence in favorofm ythesis: the continuity between Kant's Opus postumum argument and al ine of thought from his earlier work. does for other duties.² Moreover,i ti su nclear how such an argument could go givent hat the moralw orld exhausts the commands of morality and the highest good is something over and abovethe moral world.³ Ishallr eturn to this below. Forn ow,t he point is that Kant'su se of the premise that agents have ad uty to promotet he highestg ood in the Critique of pure reason mayb ei nferred from the third stepo ft he argument: his appeal to "oughti mplies can" (OIC).
In the Critique of pure reason,K ant appeals to OIC in summarizing his reasoning about the question of hope:
[…]a ll hope concernsh appiness,a nd with respect to the practical and the moral lawi ti s the very same as what knowledge and the natural lawiswith regard to theoretical cognition of things. The former finallyc omesd own to the inferencet hat something is (which determines the ultimatef inal end) because somethingo ught to happen […] ( KrV A805 f./ B833 f.) This is sometimes referredt oa st he "capacity-expanding" application of OIC.⁴ That is, Kant infers from (1) OIC and (2)o ne ought to promotet he highest good to (3) it is possible to promotet he highest good, thereby appealing to OIC and modus ponens to expand our capabilities.⁵ Kant'sa ppeal to OIC works togetherw ith the fourth premise of my reconstruction to generate practical grounds for belief in the practical postulates. In the Critique of purereason,for instance, Kant claims thatthe highest good argument leads to the concept of awill that is "omnipotent, […] (KrV A815/B 843) . Similarly, in the Critique of practical reason Kant claims thatthis argument enables him to infer the "omnis- Beck contends that "it is seriouslymisleadingtosay that thereisacommand to seek the highest good which is different from the command to fulfil the requirements of duty" (1963, 245) .  This point can be sharpened: it is also unclear how therec ould be ad uty to realize am oral world, for if an agent realizes his/her own moral perfection, s/he has exhausted the commands of morality directedathim/her,and the moral world is somethingoverand abovethe moral perfection of anys ingle agent.  See Martin (2009,110) . Timmermann thinks that Kant uses OIC onlyinits capacity-expanding (and never in its duty-restricting) form (2003, 118) . But in On the common saying Kant argues that because humans areu nable to renouncet heir happiness,t hey have no duty to do so .  As reconstructed here, the argument in the Critique of pure reason is enthymematic: the second premise is unexpressed. See n.23b elow and the paragraph to which it is appended for a complication regarding the interpretation of this enthymematicp remise.
cience, all-beneficence, omnipotence,a nd so forth" of the author of the world (KpV AA 5:139) .⁶ The fifth premise in my reconstruction might seem unnecessarilystrong.On the one side, it might be thought that theoretical proofs could work in concert with practical grounds.O nt he other side, it might be thoughtt hat practical grounds have the potential to trump theoretical proofs to the contrary. Nonetheless, Kant does insist on this idea.⁷ Indeed, in the Critique of practical reason Kant suggests thattheoretical proofs for God and immortality would undermine moralitybecause, armed with such proofs, humans, being what they are, would not pursue moral ends from duty but from fear of punishment.⁸ And Kant maintains that theoretical proofs against God and immortalityw ould trump practical ones because practical reason takes primacy over theoretical reason onlyw hen its object is theoreticallyp ossible.⁹
The sixth and final premise in the argument,l atent in the passages cited above, is that in the absenceo ft heoretical proof one wayo ra nother,t he practical grounds from the highestg ood justify belief in God and immortality.H owever,itisimportant not to misunderstand this key stepinthe argument.K ant is not arguing that morality makes true claims about the world and thereby provides truth-conducive evidence for God and immortality.R ather,K ant'si dea is that morality lowers the evidentiary bar required for one to be justified in believing.¹⁰ Thus, Kant cautions us that although through this argument "reality is giventothe […]ideas of God, freedom, and immortality," nonetheless, this is "always onlyw ith reference to the practice of the moral law" (KpV AA 5:138) .
Kant takes his highestg ood argument quites eriously,n ot onlys tating it repeatedlyi nm ultiple works but also claiming thatw ithout the doctrine of the highestg ood, "we must […]r egard the moral laws as empty figments of the  Förster claims that it is first in the Critique of the powero fj udgment that Kant infers an omniGod from the highest good argument (2005, 130) . As the paragraph to which this note is appended shows,this is incorrect.  Perhapsmost famouslyw henassertingthe need to "deny knowledge in order to make room for faith" (KrV Bxxx) . But see also, e. g., KpV (AA5 :142)a nd VNAEF (AA8 :418 n.).  KpV (AA5 :146 -8).  The claim that practical reason presupposes the theoretical possibility of its object is baked into Kant'sa ppeal to OIC (see KpV AA 5:143) .  In sayingt his Ia ma scribingt oK ant am oral encroachmentt heory of justification liket hat developed in Pace(2011) . Forhelpful discussion of different kinds of warranted assent in Kant, see Chignell (2007) . However,Iam wary of the behaviorist connotations of assent in this context. brain" (KrV A811/B 839). However,a sn oted abovea nd as Is hall try to substantiate now,K ant was ambivalent about the premises of this argument.¹¹ That Kant has different conceptions of the highestg ood has been explored extensively in the secondary literature.¹² Indeed, some arguethat Kant'sdifferent conceptions of happiness (not documented here) are due partlyt oa mbiguity about whether the highest good must be realized in this worldo ra nother.¹³ This is relatedt ot he fact,n oted above, that in the Critique of pure reason the highestg ood is introduced as something for which to hope, something to give motivational forcet ot he laws of morality;i nt he Critique of practical reason, by wayofcontrast,these ideas about motivation are jettisoned (onlytobepicked up again in later works).¹⁴ Instead, the highest good is introducedasthe "unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason" (KpV AA 5:108) .¹⁵ Issues surrounding the nature of the highest good bleed into issues surroundingt he second premise in the abover econstruction, for the conception of the highest good will determine the nature of the duty to promote it.¹⁶ But there are also other issuesregardingthe second premise. Forexample, in the Critique of practical reason,Kant remarks that because "the highestgood […]isana priori necessary object of our will and inseparablybound up with the moral law, the impossibility of the first must also provet he falsity of the second" (KpV AA 5:114) .¹⁷ But in the Critique of the power of judgment,Kant suggests thatsomeone  Kant'sambivalenceextends beyond the substanceofthe premises: "Kant uses the word 'postulate' rather looselyand […] h is list of practical postulates varies from placet op lace[ … ]e ven within the Critique of Practical Reason" (Beck 1963, 259) .  See, e. g., Reath (1988) .  Consider: "It is not by chancethat thereisambiguity in the definition of happiness and ambiguity surroundingt he location of the highest good" (Wike 1994,2 5). If ollow Wood (2001, 281n.11) in beings uspicious of Wike'se xplanationo fK ant'sc onceptions of happiness.  See, for example, RGV (AA6 :5), where Kant asserts that the idea of the highest good "meets our natural need, which would otherwise be ahindrance to moral resolve." It might be helpful to consider this in light of the remarks in n3a bovea nd the paragraph to which it is appended. I return to it below.  Forafuller discussion of this point (and much else), see Pasternack and Rossi (2014, section 3.5) or Düsing( 2002,105) .  Beck points out that if the highest good is conceived as aworld in which happiness is proportionatet ov irtue (as Kant is wont to conceive it) rather than as aworld in which everyone is maximallyv irtuous and maximallyh appy (as in the abover econstruction), then the Critique of practical reason immortality argument is rendered void: the highest good so conceivedw ould not require holiness or,t hus,a ni nfinitet emporal progression toward holiness (1963, 268f.) .  Echoingt he claim from the Critique of pure reason (reproduced abovei nt he paragraph to which n.11 is appended) about morality beinganempty figment of the brain without the highest good.
Kant'sp ost-1800 Disavowalo ft he Highest Good Argument fort he Existence of God who cannot convince herself of the existenceofGod would not have to surrender the moral law: rather, " [a] ll that would have to be surrendered in thatcasewould be the aim of realizingthe final end in the world" (KpV AA 5:451) .¹⁸ Both of these passages evince Kant'sc ommitment to OIC.B ut whereas the first suggests a strongc ommitment to ad uty to promotet he highestg ood (bound up with the legitimacy of morality as aw hole), the second suggests aw eaker commitment to the pursuit of the highest good, apursuit that even maybeforesworn (without rejectingm orality writ large)i nc ase the conditions of its realization are rejected.¹⁹
The prefacet ot he first edition of the Religion within the boundaries of mere reason reveals ayet more complicated picture of Kant'scommitment to boththe second and third premises.K ant says theret hat the command to pursue the highestgood "does not increase the number of morality'sduties" but rather arises from "our natural need" to have an end at which to aim when considering the commands of morality, an eed the repudiation of which would be a "hindrance to moral resolve" (RGV AA 6:5) .²⁰ Kant reiterates this in an extended footnote.²¹ In these passages, to promotet he highest good is enjoined by reason, but it exceeds and is not contained in the moral law.²² Nonetheless, he goes on to assert that because human capacity does not sufficet ob ring about the highest good, "an omnipotent moral being must be assumed[ … ]u nder whose care this would come about" (RGV AA 6:8n.) . This bearso nK ant'sc ommitment to OIC  This point is also made in Pasternack and Rossi (2014, sections 3.5.4 -5) .  This poses ap roblem for the Düsings' claim that the "essential contents" of the Critique of practical reason highestg ood argument arep reserved in the Critique of the powero fj udgment (2002, 112) : on their account of the former,one cannot relinquish the highest good without giving up all other moral ends,for all other moral ends aresubordinatetothe highest good (2002, 108) .  This might be taken to ground an indirect duty to promotethe highest good. However,K ant does not says o, and detailed discussion is beyond the scopeo ft his paper.  RGV (AA6 :7 n.). Similarly, in an important footnotei nOn the common saying Kant remarks that "the need for afinal end assigned by purereason[…]isaneed of an unselfish will extending itself beyond observanceo ft he formal law" (TP AA 8:280n.) . However,h et hen asserts that "thereis[…]the dutytobringita bout as far as we can that such arelation (a world in keeping with the moral higheste nds) exists."  Kant'sargument for this rests on the assertion that the laws of morality "command absolutely […]and thereby […]make of duty an object of the highest respect,without proposingtous […] an end […]s uch as would constitutes ome sort of inducement" (RGV AA 6:7n.) . This might be read as an assertion that therea re no ends that area lso duties.I fs o, it is contradictedi nt he Metaphysics of morals.
(premise 3), for the "ought" in this version of the argument is not the oughto f duty but something else.²³ Kant'sambivalence regardingthe fourth premise manifests in his varying explanations of whyG od and immortality are necessary for the highest good. For instance, in the Critique of practical reason the postulate of immortality flows "from the practicallyn ecessary condition of ad uration befitting the complete fulfillment of the moral law" (KpV AA 5:132) . But in part two of the Religion within the boundaries of mere reason Kant seems to repudiatet his, arguing thata changei nd isposition is sufficient for moral goodness and, therefore, that "notwithstanding his permanent deficiency, ahuman beingcan stillexpecttobegenerally well-pleasingtoGod, at whatever point in time his existencebecut short" (RGV AA 6:67) .²⁴ Similarly, Förster catalogsn ofewer than four separate roles attributed to God in these texts.²⁵ And it is also notable thatf reedom, omitted in my reconstruction above, is sometimes mentioned and sometimeso verlooked in Kant'sv arious statements of the highest good argument.A ll of these shifts suggest Kant'sd issatisfaction with his articulation and defense of premise four.
Kant'schangingattitude toward the fifth premise is evidenced by his changing attitude towardp hysicotheology. Forexample, in the Critique of pure reason Kant argues that "neither in speculative nor in naturalt heology[ … ]d ow ef ind even asingle significant ground for assuming asingle being to set before all natural causes" (KrV A814 f./B 842f.): the highest good argument is what leads (inexorably)tophysicotheology(KrV A815 f./B 843f.). But in the Critique of practical reason,K ant claims that even if physicotheologyc annot justify belief in an omniGod, "we can well infer from […the] order,p urposiveness, and magnitude [of the world] a wise, beneficent, powerful, and so forth author of it" (KpV AA 5:139) .²⁶ More, although Kant does not think thatphysicotheologycan justify belief in an omniGod by the time of the Critique of the power of judgment,hedoes think that it provides the highest good argument with "desired confirmation" (KU AA 5:479) .²⁷ Note the changeinevidential relations:from highest good leadingto  Whether Kant was awareo ft his is unclear;n ote that in the Critique of purer eason passage reproduced above, Kant appeals to OIC "with respect to the practical and the moral law" (my emphasis).  Kant'sdiscontentwith his immortality argument might be borne out in his claim that belief in immortality "is onlyabelief in the second rank" (Refl AA 19:644;translation from Wood 1970, 182n.). However,K ant continues unambiguouslyt os upport the immortality postulatei np ublished worka sl ate as 1796 (see VNAEF AA 8:418) .  See Förster( 2005,e sp. 134 f.) .  This poses aproblem for the Düsings,who maintain that,according to Kant,theoretical philosophyy ields onlyn egativet heology (2002, 101) .  At KU (AA5 :445)i tp rovides "incidental confirmation." physicotheologytothe two being independenttophysicotheologyprovidingconfirmation.
With all of this (that is, Kant'sr epeated and substantive reformulationso f the highest good argument) in mind, Is ubmit that it should be unsurprising to find Kant eschewing the highestg ood argument for the existenceo fG od in the Opus postumum.²⁸ 2K ant's Opusp ostumum rejection of the highest good argument
In order to find support for my thesis in the Opus postumum,o ne must looka t the first and seventh convolutes of the text (in volumes 21 and 22 of the Academy edition), which are dated to 1800 or thereafter.²⁹ There are four main ways in which the Opus postumum supports my thesis: (1) Kant articulates( repeatedly) ad ifferent argument for the existenceo fG od, one which also falls within the purviewo fm oral theology; (2)K ant claims (repeatedly) that this different argument is the onlypossibleway to justify belief in God; (3) Kant says that the concept of God just is the concept of the author of the laws of duty (a concept that encapsulates the argument referred to in (1)); and (4) the highest good argument has all but disappeared. Ishall return to (4) in the next section. Fornow,Ifocus on (1), (2)a nd (3).
In support of (1), consider the following eight passages:
a) The categor.I mper.a nd the thereupon grounded knowledge of all man'sd uties as divine commands is the practical proof of God'sb eing. (OP AA 21:74.8 -10)³⁰ b) Categorial imperative which our reason expresses throught he divine. Freedom under laws, duties as divine commands.There is aG od  It might be objected that these reformulations evinceK ant'sincreasingacuity regarding the highest good. Length constraints prevent me from addressingt his objection, which Io we to an anonymous referee, in full. But It hink it worth pointingo ut that Kant goes back and forth repeatedlyo nt hese issues (see n.14 abovea nd the paragraph to which it is appended) and does not seem always to be awareo fe ither his vacillations or their implications (see n.23 abovea nd the paragrapht ow hich it is appended).  See Förster'sdiscussionofAdickes' datingofthe manuscript in the translator'sintroduction to the Cambridge blue series Opus postumum (xxiv-xxix). See also Adickes (1920,p h) Ac ommand, to which everyone must absolutelyg iveo bedience, is to be regarded by everyone as from ab eingw hich rules and governs over all. Such ab eing, as moral, however,i sc alled God. So therei saGod. In these passages, Kant articulatesanew argument for God'se xistence. This argument,like the highest good argument,begins from the moral law. However,it does not proceed through the highest good: it appeals directlytothe necessityof regardingduties as divine commands,whenceitfollows that God exists (in order to command accordingly). Ishallreturn to this argument toward the end of section 3below to suggest one wayinwhich it might be fleshed out.For now,Itake these eight passages to establish (1), thatinthe Opus postumum Kant articulates (repeatedly) ad ifferent argument for the existenceo fG od (different from the highestgood argument), one which also falls within the purview of moral theology.³³ Now consider the following three passages in support of (2)(which also support (1)): Kant'sp ost-1800 Disavowalo ft he Highest Good Argument fort he Existence of God i) However,therestill seems to be the question as to whether this idea, the product of our own reason, has reality or whether it is am ere thought-object (ens rationis), and there remains to us nothingbut the moral relationship to this object [namely, God] -which is merelyproblematic, and which leavesonlythe formula of the knowledge of all human duties as (tanquam)divine commands, whenever the iron voiceofthe categorical imperativeo fd uty resounds between all siren temptations of the senses and threatening deterrents. j) Onlyashypothetical,however,can such an ens constituteaprinciple -not as given, but onlyasthought […]but onlyfor the sakeofthe recognition of our duties as divine commands. k) Therei sonlyone practicallysufficient argument for faith in one God, which is theoreticallyinsufficient -knowledge of all human duties as (tanquam)divine commands. In these passages, Kant says that the onlyway to justify belief in God is through the moral relationship referred to in passages a-h("thereremains to us nothing but the moral relationship to this object"); thatGod can be thoughtash ypothetical "onlyfor the sake of the recognitionofour dutiesasdivine commands";that there is "onlyone practicallysufficient argument" for God, the one occurringi n passages a-h, not the highest good argument.Toput it bluntly: accordingtothe post-1800 Opus postumum Kant,theree xists exactlyone argument to justify belief in God,a na rgument beginning with the idea that agents are compelled to regard their duties as divinec ommands. Finally, Ir eproduce the following four passages in support of (3): In these passages, Kant introduces the concept of God as if derivedf rom the argument in passages a-k: God is justified by virtue of regardingo ne'sd uties as divinec ommands, whencei tf ollows thatt he concept of God is the concept of ab eing "who is capable of and entitled to command all rationalb eingsa ccording to laws of duty." Thus, Ithink passages l-oprovide confirmation for the lesson Ia mt rying to draw from passages a-k. Manymore passages could be cited in support of (1), (2)and (3).³⁶ However,I would like to sayo nlyt wo more thingsb efore turning to the next section.
First,o ne might make finer distinctions than Ih avei ns etting out the Opus postumum argument for God.³⁷ The Opus postumum is as et of notes Kant made for himself, not for publication, and he tries and retries diverse lines of argument,s ometimes with subtle (and sometimes with not so subtle)v ariations. Forinstance,atOP (AA22:120.1-2) Kant says that "[t]oprescribe all human duties as divine commands is already contained in every categorical imperative," which suggests that he might take this new argument to be analytic. Another variation is suggested at the end of OP (AA2 2:121.13 -21)w hen Kant remarks thatt he knowledge of duties as divine commands engenderedt hrough his argument is authorized "as aprinciple of practical reason, in which there is avalid inference from ought to can." It is unclear what work OIC is doing here, and this is one of the onlyp laces in the Opus postumum whereO IC is appealed to in this context. One might conjecturethatitisavestigeofthe highest good argument.However,I shall not pursue such conjectures here: for my purposes, it suffices to point out that the theme on which these variations are made is the disappearance of the highestg ood.
Second, Kant'sn ew argument for God in the Opus postumum is connected with his Opus postumum argument for the uniqueness of God, one in which he maintains thatt he existenceo fm oret han one being who is all-obliging  Fori nstance, OP (AA2 1:17.2-3, 17.12 -15,2 2.28-29,2 2.30 -31, 25.10 -21,2 8.11-17,3 0. 4 -11, 37.11-18, 50.20 -22, 60.31-32, 79.11-12, 113 .9 -10,1 18.16,1 44.24-25,1 45. 4 -5, 146.25-28, 152.18 -21 and 157.16 -17) . See also OP (AA2 2:49.21-22, 49.23 -26,5 1.18 -52.2,5 3.3 -6, 54.7-8, 56.1-2, 57.16 -18, 57.22-25,5 8.3 -9, 58.30 -32,5 9.1 -2, 64.21-29,1 04.8 -12,1 05.6 -9, 109.20 -25,1 12.3 -10,1 16.10 -11, 116.27-117. 5, 118.11-13,1 18.14 -15,1 19. 20 -22, 120.8 -15, 120.24-26,122.3 -8, 122.22-23,122.24-25,126.18 -23,127.5 -11, 127. 23-26,128.11-21,1 28.22-24 and 129.3 -6) .  Adickes distinguishes four versions (1920,8 02 -11). Smith collapses Adickes' first twov ersions but otherwise follows him in this (1962, 638 -40) . The distinctionb etween the thirda nd fourth versions also might be collapsable givenK ant's Opus postumum contention (perhaps articulated under the influence of Lichtenberg(see Smith 1962, 637f.) ) that to have an idea of God is to believeinGod. (Itisonthe basis of this contention that some maintain that Kant renounces his critical stancet owardt he ontologicala rgument in the Opus postumum.) but never obliged is self-contradictory.³⁸ Moreover,K ant often seems to want to make both arguments in one fell swoop:
p) The beingwhose will is apractical lawfor all rational beings,isthe highest moral being
[…]t he highest intelligencew hich is distinguished froma ll world-beingsa nd which is law-givingb yo ne principle,t hat is, it is God. Theret herefore is one God. This connection is more notable because Kant'sp reoccupation with provingt he uniqueness of God in the Opus postumum seems to be connected (sometimes explicitly) with his effortst op rovet he uniqueness of the world.⁴⁰ This indicates that Kant'si nterest in his new argument for God is bound up with al argerr esearch program aimed at as uite of problems he was trying to solve at the time. It thus lends further legitimacy to my thesis.
3W hy Id on ot find the counterarguments persuasive
As noted in the introduction to this paper,mythesis originallywas articulated by Adickes in his 1920 commentary on the Opus postumum.⁴¹ Adickes' commentary, which came out before the Opus postumum was more generallyavailable, makes extensive use of Kant'stext and was widelyinfluential. Forexample, in the second edition of his commentary on the Critique of pure reason,S mith generally follows Adickes' lead in interpreting the Opus postumum,i ncluding Adickes' claim regardingK ant'sr ejectiono ft he highestg ood argument for the existence of God.⁴² Dakin then follows both Adickes and Smith in an essayonK ant'sp hilosophyo fr eligion.⁴³  See, e. g., OP (AA2 2:124.22-26).  My translation. See also OP (AA2 2:61.8 -11). The claim that therei s( only) "one principle" might be an attemptt or ule out the possibility of two all-but-one-obliging( or three all-buttwo-obliging,e tc.) but never-obligedb eings.B ut if there can be multiple sourcesf or as ingle principle, the challenge remains.  It hink this comeso ut especiallyi nt he first convolute. [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] 5 5.8, [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] However,a fter the Opus postumum became more generallya vailable, Schrader published ac riticism of Adickes' argument and the dialogue seems to have died off. In support of this (i. e., that the dialogue died off), Io ffer three pieces of evidence. First,t he Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on "Kant'sPhilosophyofReligion" does not cite Adickes in anyofits (extensive) bibliographies,a nd although it mentions( and repudiates) commentators who think Kant rejected the highestg ood argument for immortality, it devotes only as hortp aragraph to consideration of God in Kant's Opus postumum and does not suggest that such consideration might reveal Kant'sr ejection of the highest good argument for God.⁴⁴ Second, although in his recent monograph on the Opus postumum Förster devotes chapter five to discussion of "The Subject as Person and the Idea of God" and gives( therein) an admirable account of some of the differences in Kant'sv arious highest good arguments for God, Försterd oes not refer to my thesis or to Adickes anywherei nt hat chapter or its associatede ndnotes.⁴⁵ Third, prominent commentators writing in the immediate wake of Schrader'sc riticism (to which Is hall advancef orthwith) cite this criticism as a decisive rebuttal of Adickes.⁴⁶ Schrader begins by pointing out the difficulties inherent in ascertaining Kant'spost-1800 views. Schrader argues that "[t]he Opus Postumum is quite similar in character to the Reflexionen" (1951, 230) . He continues in afootnote: "One can imagine the difficulties that would be involved in trying to ascertain Kant's views if it were necessary to substitute his Reflexionen for the Critique of Pure Reason" (1951, 230n.2). Schrader concludes thatbecause there is "no indication" of as hift in Kant'st hinkingw ith regard to the highest good argument prior to  Dakin (1962[ originally1 939 ], 413 -6).  Pasternack and Rossi (1994,s ections 3.6.3 and 4) . The neglect of Adickes is made moren oticeable by the inclusion in their second bibliographyofGreene'sessayonKant's Religion within the boundaries of mere reason,anessayinwhich Greene, writing(likeSmith) beforethe full text of the Opus postumum became generallya vailable,a ccepts Adickes' contention about Kant's abandonment of the highestg ood argument for God (1960 [originally1 934 ], lxv f.).  Förster (2005,c hapter5 ,e sp. 137-47) . Givent hat Förster referst oA dickes elsewhere in the text and even includes Adickes in the index, his silencer egarding Adickes in chapter5isespe-ciallyt elling.I ti sa lso worth pointingo ut that Förster makes no referencet oA dickes or to my thesis in the section on "Practical self-positing and the idea of God" in the translator'sintroduction to the Cambridge blue series Opus postumum.  Consider: "Afteracareful examination of [the Opus postumum…]P rofessor G.A.S chrader demonstrated the inadequacyo fA dickes' interpretation" (Greene and Silber 1960,c xl) . See also Beck (1963, 274n.35) .Beck'spost-Schrader disavowal of Adickes' thesis is the moreremarkable because he previouslyh ad subscribedt oi t( 1950 [originally1 949], 47-9). 1800,any case for ashift after1800 "is initiallyweakened" and must be tenuous, indeed. Iw ould like to sayt wo thingsa bout this.
First,t herea re multiple shifts in Kant'st hinking on the highest good argument prior to 1800.Asnoted in the first section of this paper,K ant tergiversates on various parts of this argument,a nd throughout his pre-1800 work he continued to experiment with different versions in ways that oftenfly in the face of earlier ones. Thus, although there is no clear evidence of Kant'shaving rejected the highestg ood argument as aw hole prior to 1800,h is texts do contain clear evidence of his dissatisfaction with the argument and,t hus, pave the wayf or his rejection of it.
Second, Schrader'sa nalogyi sabad one. It is true thatt herea re ways in which the Opus postumum is likeK ant's Reflexionen and that it would be well nighi mpossible to reconstruct the Critique of Pure Reason from the Reflexionen. But on the one side, Ia mn ot attemptingt or econstruct Kant'sp ost-1800 views writ large:m yt hesis is about onlyo ne specific part of Kant'sp ost-1800 views. And on the other side, Ia mn ot attemptingt or econstruct Kant'sv iews on this particularquestion by appeal to asingle or even asmall number of fragmentary and merelysuggestive excerpts.Onthe contrary, Kant revisits this issue regularly throughout the Opus postumum,a nd as mayb es een from the previous section, his texts are as clear and unequivocal on this score as could be desired.
Schrader next pointso ut that Adickes basedh is advocacy of my thesis on perceivedd eficienciesi nK ant'sh ighest good argument.F or example, Adickes thoughtt hat the highest good argument is tooo bjective,a nd when Kant says in the Opus postumum that faith in God is purelys ubjective,A dickes takes Kant to have recognized the flawt hat he, Adickes,d iagnosed. Against this, Schrader complains that Kant characterizes the highest good argument as subjective in his earlier work.⁴⁷ Similarly,A dickes thought that the highest good argument introduces ah edonisticp rinciple into Kant'se thics and that Kant came to recognize this in the Opus postumum,whereas Schrader points out that there is no evidence that Kant ever took his highest good argument to introduce hedonismi nto his moral philosophya nd, in fact,t herei sa mple evidence that he did not.⁴⁸ Iwould liketosteer amiddle course between Adickes and Schrader on these issues. Against Schrader In ote that Kant'sc haracterization of the highestg ood argument as subjective prior to 1800 is no evidence that he did not come to see it  See (1951, 231-3and 236f.) . Schrader is followedhere by Silber (Greene and Silber 1960,cxl) .  See (1951,234 f.) . Silber argues also that hedonism has apositive placeinKant'sphilosophy (Greene and Silber 1960,c xl f). as objective later,a nd the same goes for Adickes' point about hedonism. But against Adickes,Iagree with Schrader that there is no evidence thatK ant came to view the highest good argument as objectionably objective or hedonistic: there is ample evidence that Kant rejected the highest good argument,b ut whyh ed id so is am atter of conjecture. Moreover,Ido not share Adickes' diagnosis of the argument'sd eficiencies. Id os hare Adickes' view that Kant was aware of some of the problems with the highestg ood argument.⁴⁹ But It ake these problems to lie elsewheret hani nb eing tooo bjective or hedonistic.
However,S chrader alsop oints out that the highestg ood argument has not disappeared from Kant'spost-1800 philosophy. Forexample, consider the following two passages from the first and seventh convolutes, respectively:
Now since wisdom, in astrict sense, onlycan be attributed to God and such abeingatthe same time must be endowed with all power;because without this the final end (the highest good) would be an idea without reality;t hus the proposition: There is aG od becomes an existential proposition. (OP AA 21:149.20 -24)⁵⁰ The first question is: is thereamoral, practical reason and together with this ac oncept of duty as aprinciple of freedom under laws,f inallyift hereisaSubstancewhich, according to these laws […]j udgest hem [men] to be worthy or unworthyo fh appiness and makes it possible for them to participatei ni t. In these two passages, Kant makes an argument like the one canvassed in section one of this paper:the existenceofGod is justified by appeal to the necessity of God for fulfilling the duty to promotet he highestg ood.
In fact,A dickes himself mentions passages in the post-1800 convolutes of the Opus postumum in which Kant rehearsest he highestg ood argument.⁵² Adickes does not takethese passages to underminehis thesis because he adopts the sound interpretive principle of considering the convolutes of the Opus postumum holistically: rather than "tear out individual passages and consider them in isolation," Adickes insists that "one must […]interpret one passageinterms of  ForevidenceIpoint to places where Kant seems explicitlytodisavowearlier versions of the argument (see n.19 and n.24 abovea nd the paragraphs to which they area ppended).  My translation.  Ihaveused Schrader'stranslation (1951,236) . However,Schrader cites the passageasbeing from OP (AA2 2:126).  See (1920,801 n.2). Indeed, Iowe the first of the twopassagesabovetoAdickes, wholabels it C415 (1920, 783) . This might come as asurprise to Silber,who attributes to Adickes the assertion that "Kant fails to restatethe [highest good] argument in the Opus postumum," an assertion that (says Silber)c an be dismissed in the wake of Schrader'si nvestigation (Greene and Silber 1960, cxli f.) . others and in terms of the whole background of thought which one is able to infer from their totality" (1920, 772) .⁵³ Indeed, this is the method thatKant recommends for understanding his work.⁵⁴ Schrader is cognizant of Adickes' interpretive method and, in fairness to Schrader,d oes not take the comparatively few passages from the first and seventh convolutes in which Kant affirms the highestgood argument by themselves to invalidatem yt hesis.⁵⁵ Neither do I. Following in Adickes' footsteps with regardt om ethod, it seems to me thatt he weight of the (many) passages in which Kant attempts to infer God directlyf rom the categorical imperative (taken as ad ivine command), of the (many) passages in which Kant states that this is the onlyw ay to justify belief in God, of the (many) passages in which Kant cashes out the concept of God in terms of divine commands, and of the (many) passages in which Kant appeals to his parallel argument to provet he uniqueness of God -the weight of all of this easilyt ips the scales against the weight of the passages cited by Schrader (and acknowledgedb y Adickes).
In fact,Ithink these putatively counter-passagesspeak in favorofm ythesis rather than against it.That is, rather than merelytakethese passages as counterweight to my thesis which is nonetheless anchored in place by others, Itakethe presence( and relative scarcity) of these passages to make more impressive the (mass of)p assages in which Kant makes his divine command argument,f or their presencer enders it more difficult to denyt hatK ant was alive to the difference between these arguments. The presenceofthese passages showswhat Kant could have done but did not do, namely: continue to tinker with the highest good argument,orevenjust let the highest good argument lie fallow and work on others. Instead of pursuing either of these strategies,h owever,K ant struggled over and over to articulate ad ifferent argument,o ne which bypassest he highest good, and he claims repeatedlyt hatt his is the onlyv iable argument,c learly thereby eschewingt he highest good argument.T op ut the point formulaically, the exception proves the rule.
Ishallconfront one lastcriticism from Schrader: he complains that the passages in the Opus postumum in which Kant speaksofthe Categorical Imperative as the voice of God "are perfectlyconsistent with his critical position" (Schrader 1951, 240) . Schrader substantiates this by appeal to excerpts liket his one:
[…]the moral lawleads through the concept of the highestgood, as the object and final end of pure practical reason, to religion, that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine commands […] ( KpV AA 5:129)⁵⁶ In this excerpt (published before the Opus postumum passages considered in the previous section werew ritten), Kant suggests that the categoricali mperative be regarded as ad ivine command on the basis of the highestg ood argument. Schrader takes the continuity between this excerpt and the claims made in the Opus postumum to indicate that Kant has neither repudiated nor modified his earlier position.
Imaintain otherwise. Although there is continuity between this excerpt and the Opus postumum argument (in the idea of regarding dutiesa sd ivine commands), therei sacrucial difference: the steppings tone of the highest good all but disappears in the first and seventh convolutes. The reason this is so crucial is thatitmanifests and, Ithink, magnifies adifferenceinthe structure of the arguments. That is, the point of conflux between pre-1800 and post-1800 passages (regardingduty as divine command) foregrounds the fact that they divergein the justificatorystructure of the connection between this regardingand belief in God: pre-1800 justifies regarding duty as divine command on belief in God (in turn justified on the basis of the highest good); post-1800,b yw ay of contrast, justifies belief in God immediatelyonthe inexorable regarding of duty as divine command.⁵⁷ However,t herei sa ne venm orei mportant continuity (than the one alleged by Schrader)b etween Kant'sp re-1800 worka nd the Opus postumum existence of God argument.Thism orei mportant continuity can be found in Kant's Metaphysics of morals and,i np articular, in the theory of conscienceK ant began to articulate in that work.⁵⁸ Fori nstance, consider the following two passages:  Schrader reproducesthis passageon(1951, 239) , however he citesitascoming from AA 5:140 (1951,239 n.5). Ih aveu sed the Cambridge blue series translation rather than Schrader'se xcept that Ih aveu nitalicized the word 'to' in both of its instances.  It is important to Adickes that Kant'spost-1800 God argument came fromK ant himself, that Kant was not,s ay,m erelyw ritingunder the influenceo fL ichtenberg ( 1920,s ection 344) . Itake the fact that Kant clearlyh ad thoughta bout regarding duty as divine command before1 800 to lend support to this.Infact thereisaplethora of pre-1800 texts showing that this idea is not new to the post-1800 Kant,although it is not generallydeployed in these texts to justify belief in God. Forexample, see KU (AA5 :481); RGV (AA6 :84, 99, 110, 153 f., 192) ; MS (AA6 :227, 440, 443, 487) ; SF AA 7:36); VNAEF (AA8 :418); VAMS (AA2 3:401.14 -15); and Br (AA1 0:192.24-32). Io we the reference to AA 6:227t oB eck ( 1963, 280n.55) , whoa lso cites Br (AA1 1:137.7-12).  As far as Ik now,this continuity was first notedb yR einhard (1927,s ection I.2).
Such an ideal person (the authorizedj udge of conscience)m ust be as crutinizer of hearts, sincet he court is set up within the human being. But he must also […be] aperson in relation to whomall duties whatsoever aretoberegarded as […] his commands […]Now since such amoral beingmust also have all power […] inorder to give effect to his laws […] and sincesuch an omnipotent moral beingiscalled God,conscience must be thought of as the subjective principle of beinga ccountable to God for all one'sd eeds.( MS AA 6:439)⁵⁹
The formal aspect of all religion, if religion is defined as "the sum of all duties as (instar) divine commands," belongs to philosophicmorals, since this definition expresses onlythe relation of reasontothe idea of God which reason makesfor itself […]wecannot very well makeo bligation (moral constraint) intuitive for ourselvesw ithout thereby thinkingo fanother'swill, namelyGod's(of which reason in givinguniversal laws is onlythe spokesman). (MS AA 6:487)⁶⁰ In the first of these twop assages, Kant argues that (1) the authorized judge of consciencei s( a) am oral being (qua imposer of obligation) and (b)o mnipotent (qua judge able to give effect to the laws of obligation); (2)amoral omnipotent being is called God; and therefore( 3) consciences hould be thought of as an agent'sb eing accountable to God.S imilarly, in the second passageK ant argues that the onlyway in which obligation can be made intuitiveisbythinkingofitas having been generated by another'swill and, in particular, by the will of God.⁶¹ Forc urrent purposes, what is most important about these two passages is that both justify belief in God on the basis of regarding one'sd uties as divine commands without appeal to the highest good. This givesm ore grist to grind against Schrader'sfirst point considered aboveabout there being "no indication" of as hift in Kant'st hinkingw ith regard to the highest good argument prior to 1800.⁶² As alreadyr emarked, there is abundant evidence of Kant'sp re-1800 dissatisfaction with the various parts of the highest good argument.M oreover,a s can be seen from these two passages, there is also evidence of Kant'sp re-1800 attempts to spello ut new grounds for belief in God,g rounds which are (prima facie)i ndependent of the highestg ood and which are based on the very idea that seems so to captivateK ant in the first and seventh convolutes of the Opus  Reinhardr efers to this passage on (1927,2 4).  Reinhardr efers to this passageo n( 1972,1 8), interpretingi ta sa na lternate solution to the problem with which Kant is grapplinga tMS (AA6 :417), that "Thec oncept of ad uty to oneself contains (at first glance) ac ontradiction." However,i nt he passagetowhich this footnotei sa ppended, Kant is talkinga bout all duties, not onlyd uties to oneself.  Despitethe similarity between these passages, it should be noted that in the secondthereis no mention of omnipotenceo ro fs crutinizingt he heart.  It also lends further support to Adickes' thesis that Kant'sp ost-1800 God argument came from Kant himself (see n.57 above).
postumum: believing in God on the basis of regardingone'sduties as divine commands (rather than the other waya round).⁶³ These passages from the Metaphysics of morals also can be used to give more structure to the Opus postumum argument explored in the previous section. Perhaps Kant'si dea is that the voice of conscience, the "iron voice" of the Categorical imperative (see passageiabove), should be regarded as the voice of God because its pronouncements are thoseo famoral being and because the being is ajudge,one with omniscience (or at least knowledge of the heart) and various other attributes that render it most appropriatet or egard it as divine. However, this must be admittedt ob ec onjectural extrapolation.⁶⁴
4C onclusion
In section 1ofthis paper,Ireconstructed Kant'shighest good argument and gave evidence of Kant'sdissatisfaction with the various premisses of this argument; in section 2, Ig avee vidence to support my thesis that Kant gave up on this argument around 1800;a nd in section 3, Ie xplained whyIdo not find the existing counterarguments to my thesis persuasive, introducing along the waye vidence of continuity between Kant'sp re-1800 and post-1800 non-highest-good remarks on the existenceofGod. Perhaps my arguments and my responses to the existing counterarguments willn ot stand the test of time. Perhaps betterc ounterarguments will appear. But as noted in the introduction to this paper,m yg oal is not onlytoargue for my thesis: it is also to revive adialogue initiated by Adickes in 1920.A nd even if my thesis is ultimatelyoverthrown, this second goal, which is probablyt he worthier one, thereby will have been accomplished.⁶⁵  Reinhardf inds evidenceo ft his line of thought also in Kant's Lectures on ethics (1927,16f.) .  Webb, writingbeforeSchrader and followingA dickes, finds astrong continuity between the Opus postumum argument and other pre-1800 lines of thought: "I[…]donot find anyreallynew doctrine in the Opus postumum" (1926, 196) . Iammorecautious:Iam unsurewhether the Opus postumum argument is new.The point Ia mm ost concerned about is not whether ag enuinely novel and unprecedented line of argument appears beginning around 1800 but rather whether ag enuinelyo ld and thoroughly explored line of argument is givenu pa round 1800.  Iwould like to express my deepest gratitude and indebtedness to Allen Wood, whogenerously providedm ew ith feedbacko na ne arlier (and significantlyw orse) version of this paper.
